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Introduction
The title of this paper may suggest that the subject matter of this
paper could have little to do with the problem of economic fluctuations
or the business cycle. If the argument of this paper is correct, however,
then question of the compass of economics is intimately connected with
the problem of cyclical fluctuations. But demonstrating this connection
requires answering a preliminary question. This paper will, therefore,
be divided into three parts.
In the first part, I address myself to the question of why the
American Economics Association (as opposed to the History of Economics
Society) should sponsor a session on Friedrich A. Hayek. Seemingly, the
most that can be argued is that economists have underestimated Hayek's
contributions to the neoclassical edifice; and that the Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economics, awarded in 1974 to Hayek as co-recipient (with
Gunnar Myrdal), rectified this oversight. Moreover, Professor Machlup
has recently supplied us with a detailed account of these achievements.^
In the second part of this paper, the connection between this pre
liminary question and the main subject - Hayek's theory of economic
fluctuations - is made apparent, if not plausible. And in the third
part, Hayek's work on economic fluctuations is finally examined in
some detail.
^Cf. Fritz Machlup, "Friedrich von Hayek's Contributions to
Economics," Swedish Journal of Economics, 76 (1974), 498-531.
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I: Hayek and the Neoclassical Paradigm
One of the most exciting developments in the methodology of the
social sciences has been the assault on "dogioatic-falsificationism," that
misinterpretation of the central thesis of Popper's work, which misinter
pretation has so misguided thinkers as to the nature of scientific prog-
' ' 3' . .
ress. Methodblegists of science have finally accepted that what scientists
4
say they do is riot a reliable basis for understanding what they in fact do.
In turn, though the work of methodologists must be informed by knowledge of
Though 1 object vigorously to the use of 'neoclassical* in relation
to current economic orthodoxy, I will nonetheless perpetuate this
solecistic usage in this paper. The neoclassical economists were, of
course, that triumvirate, Carl Menger, William Stanley Jevons and
Leon Walras, and their followers, who overthrew the paradigms of
classical economics (rea,lly Ricardian economics); and who substituted
marginalist and subjectivist economics in its stead. The orthodoxy with
which this paper is concerned would be more appropriately designated as
neo-classical, or post-neoclassical (a phrase suggesting a certain
symmetry with *post-Keynesian').
3 ' • • 'The author's first acquaintance with these developments was Imre
Lakatas and Alan Musgrave, eds.. Criticism arid the Growth of Knowledge
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1970); especially, Imre Lakatos,
"Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,"
pp. 91-196 of that volume. On the question of how Popper has been mis
interpreted, cf. Lakatos, pp. 180-84.
"The hallmark of dogmatic falsificationism is then the recognition
that all theories are equally conjectural. Science cannot prove any
theory. But although science cannot prove, it can disprove: 'it can
perfbriQ with conplete logical certainty [the act of] repudiation of what
is false,' that is, there is in an absolutely firm empirical basis of facts
which can be used to disprove theories." Lakatos, p. 96
4
The methodology of 'science' here refers specifically to the 'hard'
sciences. Lakatos' ideas were only just being extended to the social
sciences at the time of his death in 1974.
the history of scientific development, and by the sociology of scientific
knowledge, this work is essentially normative. The methodology of science
deals with science at its best, not with hack science.^
The conclusions of this methodological work that are of most interest
concern the competitiveness of scientific paradigms, or scientific research
programmes, in Lakatos* terminology, A research programme consists of a
series of connected theories, each of which succeeds the other, as a
virtual reformulation of the first theory, under the weight of anomalies.
Lakatos has replaced the concepts of falsifiability and operationalism
with the "requirement of continuous growth'*; dnii He has condluded that:
"Mature science consists of research programmes in which not only novel
facts but, in an important sense, also novel auxiliary theories are
anticipated; mature science unlike- pedestrian trial"and-error - has
'heuristic power.
Of still more immediate concern here is Lakatos' observation that:
"The history of science has been and should be a history of competing
research programmes (or, if you wish, 'paradigms'), but it has not been
and should not be a succession of periods of normal science: the sooner
competition starts, the better for progress."^ Science "has been and
'Hack science' is used by John Watkins to refer, by implication, to
that kind of scientific activity that Thomas Kuhn has designated "normal
science." Lakatos also uses the term in a pejorative sense to refer to
those fact-gatherers who work within, but never question a scientific
paradigm. Cf. John Watkins, "Against 'Normal Science,'" p. 27 in Lakatos
and Musgrave; and Lakatos, p. 152.
^Lakatos, p. 175. On the concept of heuristic value, particularly
positive heuristic value, cf. Lakatos, pp. 134-38. Lakatos notes there
(on p. 137) that: "We must appraise research programmes....for their
heuristic power: how many new facts did they produce, how great was 'their





should be" a historyof competing research programmes because the 'facts'
are not made present to the human mind independently of theories
g
("observational theories") within which these facts are interpreted. i
The decision criteria for choosing between rival research programmes are
complex, and these criteria must relate to Lakatos' concept of continuous
growth. Competition provides the climate for this growth. Logical
positivism (more precisely: "dogmatic falsificationism"), with its simple
criterion of falsifiability, is dead and the burial is in progress.
The implications for economists' attitude toward their discipline are
immediate and apparent. Economists have considered it &hillmatk of science
that research develops in a common paradigm. Divergent and competing schools
of thought have been eschewed, because their existence has been thought to
characterize the pre-scientific era of that discipline. Paradigms are
changed slowly, if at all. Scientific Revolutions are to be deplored,
because they upset the slow accretion of scientific knowledge. The state
of scientific knowledge can be summarized in the latest textbooks, written,
as they are, within the current paradigm; and incorporating (at least at
publication date), as they do, the latest facts discovered by application
8 "...No factual proposition can ever be proved from an experiments
Propositions can only be derived from other propositions, they cannot be
derived from facts: one cannot prove statements from experiences - 'no
more than by thumping the table.' This is one of the basic points of
elementary logic, but one which is understood by relatively few people
even today." Lakatos, p. 99. Footnote reference to Popper omitted. On
the general problem of dogmatic falsificationism, cf. Lakatos, pp. 95-
103.
of that paradigm. This above is the ^textbook' view of science and
9
economics.
It cannot be overemphasized that, if Lakatos* views are correct, the
attitude of many economists on the non-competitiveness of paradigms is
not merely unscientific, but anti-scientific. The view ignores at once the
history of scientific progress; and the view is the virtual negation of the
normative rules of that progress. Indeed, to extend somewhat Lakatos' own
argument, I would contend that this characteristic view of science rather
harks back to the religious dogmation of medievalism, from which science
was to emancipate mankind.
Where does this leave us in answering the original question of why
we should honor the contributions of one man (i.e., F. A. Hayek) to the
neoclassical paradigm? The answer is that we should not honor him if this
was indeed his accomplishment. But to conceive of Hayek's contributions
to economics as mere additions to the neoclassical research programme would
be mistaken. Though some of his work, like The Pure Theory of Capital, does
represent important, if largely unrecognized, contributions to the neo
classical research programme, Hayek's major contributions to economics is
Q
The argument of this section parallels that of Murray Rothbard's
provocative essay, "Ludwig von Mises and the Paradigm of Our Age," in
Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature (Washington: Libertarian Review
Press, 1974), pp. 134-46; especially pp. 134-35. Rothbard refers to the
'textbook' view of science as the "whig theory of the history of science."
Indeed, Lakatos himself has pointed out that his position is a call
for "methodological tolerance." It should be obvious at this point that
the author accepts - in the large - Lakatos' analysis of the methodological
problems of the sciences. But it would be beyond the scope of this paper to
defend the thesis. The interested reader is directed to Lakatos for this.
The 'orthodox' view of economics (which I am criticizing) treats
economics as "Normal science." Popper has remarked that normal science
the activity of ... the not-too critical professional.... In my view the
'normal scientist,' as Kuhn describes him, is a person one ought to be
sorry for... [He] has been taught badly." Karl Popper, "Normal Science and
its Dangers," p. 52 in Lakatos and Musgrave. Watkins has drawn the explicit
parallel between Kuhn's science and theology or religion: "...Kuhn sees the
scientific community on the analogy of a religious ©mmunity and sees science
as the scientist's religion." Watkins, p. 33.
in offering a competing and progressive scientific research programme with
positive heuristic value. This programme represents a competitive alterna
tive to the neoclassical paradigm; and an alternative that at least in some
respects is superior to that paradigm,In sharing common roots with the
current orthodoxy,. Hayek's programme shares some of the desirable features
of neoclassical economics. . But he has progressed where neoclassical, par
ticularly neo-Walrasian, economics has stalled.
In the dominant view of science, to continue to work within an
alternative research programme is a failing: one that might even put one
outside the pale of science. To state the probl^ci bdldljr, X suspect that
a good many economists were incredulous at Hayek's being designated as
co-recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, because they doubted
12
his work is altogether scientific. The source of the doubt would be the
recognition that his contributions do not always fit well in the current,
neoclassical research programme. What Lakatos has taught us is that this
might not be a failing, but might be an accomplishment worthy of praise,
perhaps even a Nobel Prize. Lakatos has reminded economists that competi
tion is beneficial, even (especially) in research programmes.
objection to Machlup's treatment of Hayek's contributions is that
Machlup fails to note the competing nature of Hayek's paradigm, I would also
disagree with Machlup's emphasis on those contributions that are most neo
classical in nature (e.g., The Pure Theory of Capital). Monumental though
these contributions are, I view them as, the least important of Hayek's work.
But in truth,. Machlup|s paper (see footnote 1) was intended to serve a very
special purpose, which it obviously served very well.
12
I am obviously not referring here to Hayek's later, political and
legal work, which is not 'scientific' in the modem, narrow sense of that
word. I am referring, rather, to his ostensibly economic work, which has
been virtually ignored in recent years.
But of Hayek's later work, it must be remembered that, he is the
author of The Sensory Order, a study on theoretical psychologyj
II; Economics - The Science of Choice?
I
The particular relevance for economics of these methodological
considerations can best be illustrated by considering of the neoclassical
programme. Identification of the quintessential feature of this paradigm
is an easy matter: the study of the allocation of scarce means toward
competing ends. The recognition of the ineluctable fact of scarcity of
means leads to the recognition that choice is necessary. Economics
becomes, then, the science of choice.
It may strike the reader as incredible that I would claim that Hayek
denied that economics is the science of choice. This might seem particularly
ironic, given the contributions of Austrians such as Wieser and Strigl
to this very conception of economics. In fact, what Hayek specifically
claimed was that a research programme studying only the implications of
scarcity and choice would soon reach a dead end (i.e., would be a
degenerating research programme).
Specifically, in his 1936 paper on the nature of economics, Hayek
called for - in effect - a new research programme in which the Pure Logic
of Choice would be isolated ("in all its purity") from the study of
13"causal processes." In his 1945 paper, Hayek thought the (by then)
traditional formulation of economics treated the economic problem as
"purely one of logic"; "If we possess all the relevant information, ^
we start out from a given system of preferences, and ^f we command complete
knowledge of available means, the problem which remains is purely one of
14logic." He then presented succinctly his objections to the then
emergent nepclassical research programme:
13,
,. Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge," in Individualism and Economic Order(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p, 35.
Ecoao^Sk'.'^ p! 77? society," in IndividualIs. and
••. The economic calculus which we have developed to solve this
logical problem, though an important step toward the solution
of the economic problem of society, does not yet provide an
answer to it. The reason for this is that the *data* from
which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole
society 'given* to a single mind which J^uld work out the
Implications and can never be so given.
Hayek's critique can be re-stated as follows. Economists start from
the individual experiment and inquires into what a rational transactor
does when confronted with scarcity. Economic theory answers the question
by developing the principle of equalizing returns to given outlays at.the
margin. The principle is generalized for society as a whole, the motives
of the individual are ascribed to the society as a whole, as thbUgh it
I <
existed as an entity; and the decision-making for that whole is analyzed
as if carried but by one person.
But the neoclassical research programme fails in what is surely one of
the essential tasks of economics as a social science: for it fails to
explain what Hayek called the "causal process" by which a system moves
toward equilibrium. The programme fails to deal with the problem of
economic coordination, simply because it literally assumes away the
problem. More precisely, it defines away the problem of economic coordina
tion: If society could meaningfully be treated as an entity maximizing
output (utility), then there would be no problem of economic coordination
whatsoever.
^^Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," p. 77.
I have benefitted from a reading of James M. Buchanan, "Is Economics
the Science of Choice/* in.Erich Strissler, Gottfried Haberler, Friedrich A.
Lutz and Fritz Machlup, Roads to Freedom (New York: Augustus M. Kelley,'
1969), pp. 47-64. Buchanan develops his argument somewhat differently than
do I; and he is chiefly concerned with a more narrowly defined problem -
welfare economics.
The problem of social coordination consists, inter alia, of the
attainment of those equilibrium states, concerning wMch neoclassical
economics provides so many theorems. The classical economic concern with
adjustment problem was seemingly lost in the solution of the paradox of
value. The boundaries that preclude consideration of these causal
processes in the neoclassical paradigm are largely self-erected.
To comprehend the problem of social coordination, economic theory
must explain "the unintended or undesigned results of the actions of
men,"^^ That is, economics must re-capture some of Adam Smith's vision
of the social economic problem. Economic theory isf compelled, then, to
explain how the separate (maximizing) decisions of individuals could lead
to an over-all order that none of these individuals ever intended or
designed. This vision of economics is the basis for an alternative research
programme. It is a programme for which Hayek and others provided a
foundation; and which Hayek developed in parts. It is to his considera
tion of one part of this programme - the study of economic fluctuations -
to which I now turn.
^^Hayek, The Counter-Revolutlon of Science (New York: The Free Press
of Glencoe, 1955), p. 25.
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III: Economic Coordination and Economic Fluctuations
The Problem and Its Setting
The failings of neoclassical economics have certainly been aired before.
But criticism is not .enough* Another research programme is needed in order to
supplant an existing one, however flawed is the latter. But where others offer
alternatives that scarcely seem to be improvements, Hayek suggested a separate
18
research programme - catallactics, the theory of the market order. His pro
gramme is most developed precisely in those areas where the neoclassical
paradigm is most lacking: the theory of economic fluctuations; or the business
cycle, as it used to be termed.
Until.a few years ago, many economists would have confidently asserted
19that the business cycle is dead. The problem of economic fluctuations has
also been cast in choice-theoretic terms - 'society' chooses between rates of
18
Hayek argues that 'economy' is a misnomer, which evidences confusion
in thinking about the nature of the economic problem. Aristotle's Oeconomica
dealt with decisions of a single household, to which the Pure Logic of Choice
applies without modification. But an 'econony, ' as we know it, involves
separate and often conflicting plans of many households.
According to Hayek, the Greek verb katallatein (from whence 'catallactics')
means not merely "to exchange," but also "to receive into the community" or
"to turn^ enemy into friend." Of. Hayek, "The Confusion of Language in Poli
tical Thought" (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1968), p. 29 and 29n.
Hayek's intellectual mentor, Liidwig von Mises, could perhaps be better
credited with having developed catallactics, or the pure theory of catallaxy,
in detail in one place (as Hayek has not). Cf. his Hnm^n Action. 3rd ed.
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1966), Part Six: "Catallactics or Economics of
the Market Society," pp'. 232-715. If it were not to invite misinterpretation,
one could characterize Mises' theory as the Austrian theory of general
equilibrium.
19 •
Cf. the recorded and edited comments by Paul Samuelson, in Victor
Zarnowitz, ed., The Business Cycle Today (New York: Columbia University Press
for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1972), p. 167. The comments were
made in Septemberj 1970.
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inflation and rates of unemployment. The choice is constrained by the
20 . ^
feasible set confronting decision-makers at any moment. Many economists
will readily offer their judgments and respect to desirable rates of infla
tion and unemployment. In general, these judgments have cast doubts on the
21 .
desirability, of trading off more unemployment for less inflation. For if
the rate of unemployment is truly, chosen (from an opportunity set), there is
no need for cyclical downturns. What sane person would choose to produce a
. ,22
recession? '
Undoubtedly, fewer economists would today assert.that the business cycle
23
is dead — "common sense cannot help breaking in." Full-emplo3mient- (at
stable or rising prices) is an increasingly elusive goal. Policy makers, be
The fact that must now .add "at any moment" indicates how severely the
original Phillips Curve hypothesis has been altered. Everybody's Phillips
Curve dances ^d twists around, now. But once it is admitted that curve moves
(apparently) autonomously, it becomes dubious in what sense we can choose a
rate of inflation and a rate of unemployment. The whole theoretical basis
for viewing the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment in terms of
an opportunity set has-been severely criticized by Axel Leijonhufvud. Cf.
"Costs and Consequences of Inflation," (Los Angeles: Mimeo, 1975).
21. .
One well-known macrotheorist put the case to me as follows: "There, is
no reason to incur any unemployment in order to slow the rate of inflation."
Somewhat more typical and more circumspect is Samuelson's position on. the
question: He remains persuaded that "even in the longest run the benefits to
be derived from militant anti-inflationary policies don't carry excessive
costs as far as average levels of unemployment and growth are concerned."
Paul Samuelson, "Worldwide Stagflation," The Morgan Guaranty Survey^ June,
1974,9. ,
'22'"
' It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that when national policy
results in recession, the policy makers are either stupid or perverse; or
both. If nothing else, the choice-theoretic approach to economic fluctua
tions has added to the shrillness of political debate.
' 23 • ' "John Maytiard Keynes,• The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money,.Harbinger Books (New York: Harcburt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964), p. 192,
The quote was chosen for itohy, as it was part of Keynes' attack on his
favorite target t 'classical economists' - for riot having Ricardo's consis
tency of thought, in that ^they permitted the real world to intrude into their
thoughts.
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they Democrat or Republican, appear to have consistently failed in recent
years. This despite the fact that advice has been freely available, and often
readily heeded. One can save the phenomena by ascribing the difficulties in
policy implementation to human venality of various sorts (imcompetent leaders,
OPEC, etc,)-. The only other real alternative is to admit that society (i.e. ,
the rulers) cannot choose the rates of inflation and of unemployment. The
whole choice-theoretic approach to economic fluctuations would then have to be
abandoned.
Friedrich Hayek's theory of economic fluctuations represents an alternative
to the current macroeconomic paradigm. He eschewed the maximization approach
in macroeconomics as he did in microeconomics.^^ The problem of economic '
fluctuations is treated as a problem of economic coordination. It is no
accident that to introduce dis-coordination into the neoclassical world one
must employ a specific, ad hoc assumption about the rigidity of some variable,
25usually the money wage rate. Barter, general equilibrium theory deals with
Two points must be made here. First, a new ambiguity in the term
neoclassical paradigm* is now apparent, 'Neoclassical' economics, could refer
either to general equilibrium analysis only; or to the synthesis of general '
equilibrium theory cum income and employment theory, a la Patinkin, I am using
the term in the latter sense.
Second, the reader may begin to suspect that Hayek denied that there is a
viable, macroeconomic theory, distinct from micro-theoretical analysis. This
would be a correct inference to draw, but one whose demonstration would be
beyond the compass of this paper,
25 , .For a critical discussion of this point, cf. Axel Leijonhufvud, "keynes
and the Classics" (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1969), especially
Lecture (pp. 12-18). R. W. Glower, Leijonhufvud and
others do, in fact, treat economic fluctuations as evidence of economic dis-
coordination. This has led one student of the work of Glower and Leijonhufuud,
as well as that of Hayek, to observe that: "If enough intellectually honest
follow Leijonhufvud and Glower's lead in attempting an integration of
the three-way split' (income-expenditure analysis, the Quantity Theory, and
general^equxlibrium theory) they will re-invent the Austrian School," John B.
^gger, Information and Unemployment in the Trade Cycle," Paper delivered at
he Symposium on Austrian Economics, University of Hartford, June, 1975 (Hart
ford: Mimeo, 1975), p. 16; footnote references omitted.
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systems that are constantly moving toward (if not already in) equilibrium. If
not dealing with perfectly coordinated systems, this family of theories is at "
least about systems with strong coordinating mechanisms. But inflations and
depressions (recessions) are processes, in which systems, at least for a time,
26
move away from equilibrium. To explain diS"Coordlnation, we need a theory of
27why the coordination of economic activities breaks down. Hayek made essen
tially this latter point in a 1928 German work:
For the essential means of explanation in static theory, which.is, i
at the same time, the indispensable assumption for the explanation
. of particular price variations, is the assumption that prices supply
an automatic mechanism for equilibrating supply and demand. '
To employ static theory to analyze situations (i.e., movements away fr^om
equilibrium) , excluded by the assumptions of that theory, necessarily leads;.to
•'
29
contradictions, Hayek suggested a solution in his 1928 work:
26
It may be argued that general equilibrium theory deals only with the
definition of,equilibrium states. But as Hayek pointed out in 1935: "It is
only by this assertion that such a tendency [toward equilibrium] exists that
economics ceases to be an exercise in pure logic and becomes an empirical
science..." Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge," p. 44.
27Gf. Axel Leijonhufuud, "Effective Demand Failures," The Swedish Journal
of Economics, 75 (1973), 27-48; especially, 28-33.
28
Hayek, Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, trans. by,N. Kaldor and
H. M. Croome (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966), p. 43; this is a reprint
of 1933 translation.
29 .^'Despite the several alternative ways that we have developed to make
the gulf between microtheory and macrotheory seem plausible to new generations
of students, the micro-macro distinction remains basically that between crodels
with 'perfectly coordinated' solutions and models where one or more markets
reach solutions only by chance. Both sets of exercises are referred to as
'theories,' but there could be no real-world economy for which both theories
are true at once." Leijonhufvud, The Swedish Journal of Economics^ 1973, 30-31. v
Italics added, and footnote referengp nmThhoH.
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The obvious, and (to my mind) the only possible way out of this
dilemma, is to explain the difference between the course of events
described by static theory (which only permits movements towards an
equilibrium, and which is deduced by directly contrasting the supply
of and the demand for goods) and the actual course of events, by
the fact that, with the introduction of money (or strictly speaking
with the introduction of indirect exchange), a new determining cause is
introduced. Money being a commodity which, unlike all others, is
incapable of finally satisfying demand, its introduction does away
with the rigid interdependence and self-sufficiency of the 'closed'
system of equilibrium, and makes possible movements which would be
excluded from the latter.' Here we have a starting-point which fulfills
the essential conditions for any satisfactory theory of the Trade
Cycle. It shows, in a purely deductive way, the possibility and the
necessity of movements which do not at any given moment tend towards
a situation which, in the absence of changes in the economic 'data,'
could continue indefinitely. It shows that, on the contrary, these
movements lead to such a'disproportionality' between certain parts
of the system that the given situation cannot continue.
Money is treated as an independent source of demand, which can generate
its own market signals and changes, quite apart from the real'factors (the
'data' of macrotheory). Money can introduce 'disproportionalities' or dis-
coordination' into the economy. It is the existence of money (i.e., monetary
disturbances), that makes possible fluctuations not possible in the barter,
general equilibrium model of the neoclassical paradigm. But the key element
in Hayek's explanation is the non-neutrality of monetary disturbances.
The importance of the neutrality question has been virtually lost in
contemporary discussions. When Hayek sparked the neutrality debate in the
thirties, he was referring to short-run, disequilibrium problems. Today, the
neutrality question is raised in the context of long-run, general equilibrium
models, which Glower has reminded us cannot be analytically distinguished from
the classical barter models, to which Hayek objected.It is, of course.
30Hayek, Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle, pp. 44-45.
Cf. R, w. Glower, "The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoretical
Appraisal," reprinted in Monetary Theory (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc.,
1970), pp. 270-71. ^
15
impossible for a money economy to have the same price and output vectors as
32
in a barter economy. Money is thus non-neutral in the long-run. But in
the thirties, the neutrality debate centered around an entirely different
issue; the question of whether there are systematic 'distribution effects'
in a process of monetary expansion or contraction. As Lutz has recently
demonstrated, monetary theorists, in assuming the absence of any systematic
distribution effects in these processes, exclude money by assumption from
33
playing any causally significant role in the economic system.
Hayek's theory is one in which the non-neutrality of money occupies
center stage. His theory is broadly Wicksellian in nature, though it differs
importantly from Wicksell's. Nor can Hayek's analysis be categorized with
monetarism. It is now to Hayek's own monetary theory of economic fluctuations
that we now turn.
The Hayek Theory of Economic Fluctuations
The feature of a production economy most emphasized by Hayek is that of
the intertemporal complementarity of investments. The capital goods of society
represent an interrelated structure - a complex mosaic. They are generally
specific, and cannot be rearranged and combined anew at will. Moreover, though
entrepreneurs will make the best use possible (and known) of whatever capital
goods there are at their disposal, unexpected changes in the data will generally
32
Patinkin demonstrates rigorously this very fact, but then ignores his
own demonstration. But the real fault does not lie in his assuming the long-
run neutrality of money; the assumption does no harm in his model. The fault
lies in conflicting the original neutrality question with an entirely
different issue; and with his consequent ignoring of the short-run non-
neutrality of money. Cf. Don Patinkin, Money, Interest and Prices, 2nd ed.,
(New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1965), p. 75.
33
Cf. Friedrich A. Lutz, "On Neutral Money," in Steissler, et al., p.
116.
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mean that new (and non-optiraal) arrangements of existing capital goods will
be continuously required. These endogenous changes in capital combinations
will cause gross investment in each capital good generally to be at a different
level than the depreciation of that good figured on expected replacement cost.
In Hayek's work, one finds a stock-flow problem of unusual complexity.
An essential feature of capital is its heterogeneity. In the long-run, capital
heterogeneity is unimportant; this is true, of course, because in the long-run
plans are consistent ex hypothesi. Capital goods will be available in the
desired proportion when plans are consistent. But with constantly changing
data, one must not only take account of the stock-flow problems in capital theory,
but also the heterogeneity of the various capital goods.
In what follows, I will treat Hayek's theory of economic fluctuations as
though it appeared in a coherent fashion in one place, though this is not the
case. Though Monetary Theory and the Trade Cvcle only appeared in English
translation in 1933, while the first edition of Prices and Production had
appeared in 1931, the former book was in reality written first; and it contains
the monetary foundations for the theory that Hayek first outlined in full in
Prices and Production.
The theory begins with a presentation of the structure of production as
a delicately balanced affair, whose smooth functioning depends upon the continued
consistency of plans. Since he was dealing with intertemporal equilibrium, it
would have been natural to express the equilibrium condition as equality
between planned saving and planned investment. But this mode of expression
obscures almost as many issues as it elucidates. With capital heterogeneity
and changing relative prices, given rates of saving and investment can be.
Hnu
cani^fl^ recent exposition of this aspect of Hayekian and Austrian
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associated with positive or negative (or zero) net investment. In addition,
as income, savings and investment are all future oriented, they are all sub
jective; transactors will ordinarily differ on whether net investment is
35
positive or negative. And they will often prove to have been in error,
Hayek suggested that the theorist foresake the traditional, Wicksellian formu
lation of intertemporal equilibrium, for a more microtheoretic formulation:
The starting point for a fully developed theory ... would be (a) the
intentions of all the consumers with respect to the way in which
they wish to distribute at all relevant dates all their resources
(not merely their *income*) between current consumption arid provision
for future consumption, and (b) the separate and independent decisions
of the entrepreneurs with respect to the amount of consumers' goods
which they plan to provide at these various dates. Correspondence
between these two groups of decisions would be characteristic of the
kind of equilibrium which we now usually describe as a state where
savings are equal to investments and with ^^ich the idea of an
equilibrium rate of interest is connected.
For transactors' plans to be consistent, the rate at which consumption
output becomes available must be equal to desired rate of consumption, at
the income levels generated by the production process (i.e., S = I). Biit as
Hayek so emphasized, there are many possible methods of production, each
making use of different capital combinations (i.e., different distributions of
factors across time). If plans are to be coordinated, there must be enough
'free' resources (i.e., resources not committed to different productive
activities) to complete a production structure already begun. In practice,
this means that there must be enough real resources available to complete the
complementary investments necessary to produce the planned consumption output
with the planned time-distribution: "...Most investments are made in the
35In The General Theory. Keynes struggled to find an income concept free
of these difficulties. Net income obviously would not do. But Keynes in effect
demonstrated that his 'income' was likewise flawed by these problems, because
its size depends on user cosl^ and in his Appendix on User Cost, Keynes demon- '
strates that user cost is an expectational magnitude. Of. Kejnies, The General
Theory, pp. 52-73.
36Hayek, ''Price Expectations, Monetary Disturbances and Malinvestments," in
Profits, Interest and Investment (New York; Augustus M. Kelley, 1970), pp. 153-
54; this is a reprint of the 1939 edition.
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expectation that the supply of capital will for some time continue at the
37
present level."
Static resource allocation tells us that relative prices are indicators of
relative scarcities; and interest rates summarize the relative intensity of
preferences across time. But static theory is directly applicable only to
perfectly coordinated systems. Hayek was asking a more fundamental question:
In a dynamic, monetary economy, under what conditions would prices coordinate,
38
instead of dis-coordinate economic activity? To anticipate the conclusion
somewhat, Hayek saw economic coordination as depending on the neutrality of
monetary policy.
Prices communicate information only in so far as they reflect real
factors. A corrollary of this proposition is that prices may communicate mis
information; and, thus, dis-coordinate decision making. In the words of one
expositor of Hayek's ideas:
[Hayek] regarded prices ...as empirical reflectors of specific
circumstances and price changes as an interrelated series of changes
in these 'signals,' which produced a gradual adaptation in the entire
price structure (and hence in the outputs of different commodities
and services) to the constant, unpredictable changes in the real
world. Pricing, in short, is seen as a continuous information-
collecting and disseminating process, but it is the institutional
framework that determines both the extent to which, and the degree
of success with which, prices are enabled to perform this potential
signalling or allocative function.
Market participants must react to constantly changing data, at least
some of which are unexpected. To the degree that prices are reflective of
37
I.e., further investments are necessary to render profitable previously
made investments: "These further investments....may be either investments by
the same entrepreneurs, or - much more frequently - investments in the products
produced by the first group by a second group of entrepreneurs." Hayek, "Price
Expectations...," pp. 142-43,
38
Relevant here is a comment made by Hayek in another context: "....Before
we can explain why people commit mistakes, we must first explain why they should
ever be right." Hayek, "Economics and Knowledge," p. 34.
39
From the editorial introduction in Sudha R. Shenoy, ed., A Tiger by the
Tail (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1972), p. 8. Italics added.
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real factors, they are transmitting correct information; and they thereby
fulfill their allocative function. The smooth functioning of markets depends
on'prices being a tolerably reliable basis upon which expectations can be
formed. One cannot treat the subject of intertemporal allocation without
reference to the formation of expectations. Nor can one be a consistent
methodological individualist and assume that expectations will always coincide
in a changing world. Indeed, divergence of expectations (with consequent
I
profits and losses) is an essential feature of a market economy. It is this
very dynamic aspect of resource allocation that necessitates a price system.
But it was not the uncorrelated and independent errors of entrepreneurs
to whi"ch Hayek referred in his work on economic fluctuations. These are the
errors that account for profits and losses in the industries of microtheory;
they represent the stimuli to more efficient resource allocation. While
their continuing existence may be a condundrum for static resource allocation
theory, their omnipresence is scarcely an insoluable problem for a market system.
Hayek was concerned with periodic breakdowns in the market communication
process (i.e., pricing), which he saw as the cause of inflation and depressions.
In either situation, the expectations of entrepreneurs are revealed to be wrong
in a consistent way: the errors are correlated and not independent. They are
They are evidence of changes in the data that have not been transmitted in the
market system; ^ of price changes that indicate changes in real factors,"
though these changes have never in fact occurred.
The specific error made by entrepreneurs in the beginning of cyclical
upswing, is to overestimate the savings that will be forthcoming. It is
the existence of artificially low interest rates at this point that bring about
the problem. And, in turn, it is expansionary monetary policy that is respon
sible for the too low a level of interest rates. As a result, investors will
20
make plans that could all be realized only if income earners planned to
consume a lower fraction of their increased income than they will in fact.
Hayek's theory is neo-Wicksellian in outline, but he is to be credited
with correcting ^icksell on one matter on which Wicksell apparently erred.
A positive discrepancy between the equilibrium and market rates of interest
does not merely result in generally rising prices (i.e., a rising price level),
but in a new set of relative prices, inconsistent with the real factors
(which, ex hypothesis are not changed). With prices wrong, resource allocation
- particularly capital investment - will prove to be inconsistent with the
preferences of income earners. In particular, intertemporal investment plans
will not be consistent with intertemporal consumption plans.
The basic, Hayekian problem is that part of the effective demand for new
capital goods consists of freshly created money (credit). There is an excess
demand for one class of commodities (i.e., 'capital goods'), with no correspond
ing excess supply of another class (i.e., consumption output). But net invest
ment cum monetary expansion will cause factor incomes to be bid up. Factor
service owners will expend this income on consumption output to a degree
inconsistent with the investment programs of entrepreneurs receiving the
newly available credit.
Once rising factor incomes and rising consumption demand results in- some
required factors of production being bid away from the uncompleted investment
programs, these programs will have to be abandoned.^® Capital will thereby
40"^ " ^It must be remembered that an investment program (project) consists of
a series of interrelated and complementary investments. In the language of
Prices and Production, the problem consists of an inability to complete a given
structure of production. The inability to attract the required resources for
completion of the structure generally renders the previous investments worth
less. Capital goods, unlike consumer goods, being incapable of satisfying final
demand, have value only in so far as the requisite, complementary factors of
production are available in sufficient supply at costs that are expected to be
recovered. Of course, if individual capital goods can be re-combined in a
different structure of production, yielding consumption output sooner, then
these goods will retain a positive price. Indeed, it will typicallv be the
t^n in'throld?"'""' -^uak-rents in'^ tL new sLucLra
21
be revealed to have been malinvested. Most importantly^ the demand for new and
replacement capital goods, of the type whose production was stimulated by the
nionetary expansion, will suddenly decrease. It is this latter process that
constitutes a Hayekian "crisis."
Hayek's theory is obviously not one of 'synchronized inflation.' Rather
the theory emphasizes the fact that new money and credit enter an economic
system at definite points. The money and credit represent purchasing power,
which is spent on particular goods, and which results in a particular (if
unknown) sequence of price adjustments and income changes (i.e., "distribution
effects"). Hayek's theory is thus part of a monetary tradition that harks
back at least to Richard Cantillon in emphasizing the importance of the
transmission mechanism of a monetary disturbance.^^
Each round of monetary expansion, which occurs at a given rate, will,
as a first approximation, reenforce the original disturbance. The misallocations
generated by the initial disturbance are ratified by succeeding disturbances.
The vector of relative prices remains at other than its equilibrium value.
It is here that factor incomes are being bid up - by the newly created
money, functioning as credit available to entrepreneurs. As these factor incomes
rise, consumption will rise. It must now be recalled that planned investment
41 The great difficulty of this question consists in knowing in what way
and in what proportion the increase of money raises prices." Richard Cantillon,
Essai sur la nature du commerce en general, ed. by Henry Higgs (London:
Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1931), p. 161. For Cantillon's own explanation of
those characteristic distribution effects that have come to be known as
'Cantillon Effects,' cf. pp. 161ff.
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expenditures exceed planned savings. Unless saving out of income changes
fortuitously, consumption will be too high to maintain this rate and pattern
of investment. Since this is the most controversial part of Hayek's theory,
running counter to standard IS-LM analysis, 1 will devote some space to
examining it.
In equilibrium, the level of the rate of interest depends upon desired
saving and desired investment. Saving depends, inter alia, upon time preference;
and investment, upon expected profit opportunities. But in the short run, the
quantities of both consumer goods and capital goods are fixed. The marginal
rate of return on additional money invested then largely depends on the flow
of consumption expenditures, and the available consumer goods, upon which that
flow may be expended. If actual consumption out of income exceeds that rate
expected by entrepreneurs, then the ex post rates of return in consumer goods
industries will be higher than the ex ante rates; and they will generally be
43
higher than the ex post rates of return in capital goods industries.
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As a heuristic exercise, one may consider the following diagram:
r = rate of interest
s - planned saving
I = planned investment
(All magnitudes are in nominal terms)
i I ^
(Ij^-Sj^) is that portion of investment that is financed by monetary expansion.
Ex post, savings will equal I-. Entrepreneurs can actually effect their
planned investments, because they are given the means (i.e., money) to effectively
demand the real resources necessary to make the investments. That is,
entrepreneurs will temporarily possess a larger fraction of the community's
wealth (note that no specific group, such as owners of labor services, have been
identified as losing wealth.).
The functions will change, of course, as prices change,
43
The issue is more complicated. The changing demand conditions will alter
not only the rate of discount (which affect capital goods' prices adversely),
but also the quasi-rents accruing to the various capital goods (changes that can
affect demand for those in a direction opposite from the effect of the change
in the rate of time-discount). Cf. Hayek, Prices and Production, 2nd ed.
(London: Routledge &Kegan-Paul, Ltd., 1935), pp. 75-96.
23
So long as ex ante saving falls short of ex ante investment, consumption at the
prices ruling at the beginning of each period will be greater than was antici
pated by entrepreneurs. The resulting increase in the prices of consumer goods
prices represents a rise relative to factor costs; and, hence, a rise in the
ex post rate of return. So long as the monetary disturbances generating the
discrepancy between saving and investment lasts, so long will this inflationary
44
process continue.
It is the rise in prices of consumer goods (relative to wage rates in
particular), generated by rising incomes, that brings an end to the investment
boom; and, eventually, to the cyclical expansion itself. The rising rates of
return in the consumer goods industries are evidence of a shortage of 'capital'
- an insufficiency of savings to complete the structure of production. The real
factors were, for a time, overlaid by monetary factors (i.e., an expansionary
monetary policy), which hid for a time the fact that the real resources were not
available to maintain the rate of investment with which the cyclical upswing
began. The expansionary monetary policy did so by distorting price and interest
rate signals. This, in turn, made it appear profitable to entrepreneurs to plan
for more future (and, hence, less current) consumption output: the opportunity
cost in terms of current period consumption output appeared lower than it was
in fact. Economic activity was consequently dis-coordinated. Yet, the very
cyclical expansion, which initially gives entrepreneurs a command over a
larger fraction of the real resources, eventually generates rising factor incomes
and consumption that brings an end to the cyclical expansion.
44Cf. Hayek, The Pure Theory of Capital (Chicago; University of Chicago
Press, 1941), p. 396.
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The crucial role of rising rates of return in consumer goods industries
is explained in more detail in Hayek, "Profits, Interest and Investment," in
Profits, Interest and Investment, pp. 3-71; and Hayek, "The Ricardo Effect,"
in Individualism and Economic Order, pp. 220-54.
24
To repeat, it is the rising rates of return in the consumer goods
46
industries that make it impossible to maintain the high rate of investment.
47
Moreover, capital losses will be revealed on earlier investments. While
one segment of the economy - the consumer goods industries - is expanding,
other segments - generally the capital goods industries - are experiencing
declining demand, curtailing output and releasing factors of production. It
is the inability of the expanding sectors to absorb factors as rapidly as they
are being released - together with the specificity of capital goods, which may
make them inappropriate to the new capital combinations - that leads eventually
to declining real incomes and cyclical contraction,
Hayek's "crisis" does not depend on the attainment of 'full-employment."
It is, of course, true that if, as is often implicitly or explicitly assumed
in macro-models, all resources are in excess supply (at going factor rental
prices), then the phenomena which Hayek detailed do not emerge. But, in
general, there need only be one factor that becomes scarce at existing prices
for these Hayekian effects to become operative. Once one factor, not entirely
specific to one activity, becomes fully-employed-and thus in excess demand at
its current factor rental price - it will be impossible for expansion in the
capital goods industries to continue in the face of rising consumption demand.
This fact is but an implication of the proposition that factors are used in
combination; and that intermediate products, being incapable of satisfying
final demand, depend for their value on the availability - at costs compensated
by the prices of the products being produced - of complementary factors of
production.
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In disequilibrium, the relevant rate of time-discounting becomes the
(high) rates of return in the consumer goods industries. Even if rates of
interest remain depressed by a monetary policy a autrance, it is to these
industries that resources will flow. This simply follows from the general
proposition that out of equilibrium, prices (here, interest rates) need not
reflect relevant opportunity costs,
47This is an important conceptual point. The capital was lost the moment
the investment plan was executed; the losses are revealed by the price changes.
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Hayek's theory thus runs counter to that presented in accelerator models.
Higher rates of growth of consumption demand may sometimes (i.e., with general
resource unemployment) raise the demand for capital goods in general.' But this
cannot always be the case, as Hayek has again recently demonstrated:
If it were true that an increase in the demand for consumer goods
always leads to an increase in investment, even in a state of- full •
employment, the consequence would be that the more urgently consumer
goods are demanded, the more their supply would fall off. More and
more factors would be shifted to producing investment goods, until,
in the end, because the demand for consumer goods would have become
so very urgent, no consumer goods at all would be produced. This
clearly points to an absurdity in the reasoning which leads to such
a conclusion.
The Relevance of Hayek Today
The chief practical and immediate concern facing economists today is to
find a solution to inflation. Hayek's contributions suggest that there are
serious flaws in the choice-theoretic approach to inflation and unemployment
I t
theory. As a consequence, macroeconomic policy may not only be aggravating,
but actually perpetuating the current inflationary recession. For Hayek has
presented a convincing case that unemployment is the effect of the previous
cyclical expansion. Moreover, cyclical expansions may be unsustainable, even
if there is widespread resource unemployment; rising consumer goods prices may
appear long before unemployment falls to a magical 'full-employment' level.
It scarcely needs saying that Hayek's theory does not fall into the category of
ad hoc hypotheses to explain how inflation and recession could co-exist. The
existence of inflationary-recessions is an implication of a theory that Hayek
first presented over 45 years ago; and his prediction ante-dates the recog-
48
Hayek, "Three Elucidations of the Ricardo Effect," Journal of Political
Economy. 77 (March/April, 1969), 284-85.
26
nition of the phenomena by some 30 or 35 years. On this ground alone, Hayek
deserves his recent honor.
It is perhaps finally being recognized that price inflation is symptomatic
of economic dis-coordination. Hayek's achievement is not only to have provided
a theory of inflation, but a research programme in which ecoiiomics is treated
as the study of economic coordination. Somewhere in the solution of the
paradox of value, the study of this coordination problem facing society was
shunted aside. Elegance in theoretical formulation was traded for applica
bility, Economists have explained the pricing of a cup of tea; but they have
forgotten what causes the wealth of nations. Hayek has suggested how, keeping
the best of the neoclassical revolution, economists can re-discover the
desirable features of classical economics; and they can finally forge a
coherent, comprehensive economics, within a general social science. This is
no small feat; and it is certainly one worthy of recognition.
